Andrew Evans

Normativity and mental disorder

A central question in the philosophy of mental health is: What is mental disorder? Theorists tend to ground considerations of mental disorder in biological dysfunction or social values. In my recent paper “Beyond Biological and Social Normativity” I argue that we should instead see all concepts of mental disorder as being grounded in normative considerations. I argue further that there are a variety of different types of norms that mental disorders deviate from including individual, well-being, and regulatory norms. I end by considering approaches which question the assumption that mental healthcare should intervene on norm deviations in the first place: the neurodiversity paradigm, social model of disability, and Mad discourse.

The aims and purview of mental healthcare

In my dissertation, I argue that the traditional biomedical, dysfunction-oriented approach to mental health discourages people from seeking necessary treatment. Alternatively, I argue that the mental health community is obligated to treat human suffering, rather than dysfunction. Building off this argument, I put foward a mental health ontology grounded in the biopsychosocial model, and then consider the implications this new ontology would have for clinical practice and research.